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安省议会通过退休福利计划 两年内实施

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自由党去吃屎好了!
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你基本上是拿不回来的。况且,自由党政府,你能信吗?到时候可能渣都不剩了。
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+1... .....
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两年内搬出安省。现在开始学法语,笨猪。
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自雇可以逃掉cpp和opp
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算了,不和大家争了, 看样子51网不是讲道理的地方, 是讲党性的地方,是一个吐嘈的地方.。。
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克飞就是各个苍蝇,恶心人,却哪里都看得到。赶紧滚吧,还51一个清净
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小克子,51上最讲党性的就属你了,不信,把你的帖子一个个拿出来让大家评评,你肯定是最讲党性原则的,你现在已经是自卫军的领军人物了,你可以做自卫军连长的指导员了,哈哈哈
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我作为雇员,我就是不喜欢!每年你自己也要放差不多2000块进去。钱看似你自己的,但是如果规定你70岁以上才能拿,而且一年只能拿一点点。你基本上是
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如果真要让大家有更多养老钱,可以强制公司为职工购买RPP,就是在商业机构(比如Manulife、Sunlife...)开一个注册账户,职工每月自愿从工资里存一部分钱进去,公司再按比例补贴一部分——我工作过的几家公司都有这项福利,一般是最多每年可contribute工资总额的4%,公司再给补贴工资总额的2%,假如我年薪5万,每年我最多可存入2000元,公司再给补贴1000元,一年下来,我的RPP账户里总共有3000元——我可以用这些钱买基金,或存成定期,无论怎样,这钱是我的,谁也拿不走。 自由党之所以要搞这个安省养老金,就是要换个名义再从老百姓手里搜刮一些民脂民膏。这钱到了腐败的自由党手里能安全吗?想想电厂丑闻被自由党挥霍掉的那11亿老百姓血汗钱吧....
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CPP好象还是多数想要的啊, 雇主和雇员出同样的钱啊。。。等于翻了一番。只是有一些雇主不想出这个钱, 光自己钱放进去, 就得考虑考虑了. 这个和CPP是一回事.。。恨的应该是雇主, 雇员恨有这个必要吗?实在不懂, 是有些人在误导!
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恭喜自由党,感谢自由党选民
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"杭特说不出退休者何时可以享受ORPP退休金". Because she wants to make sure most people cannot enjoy the ORPP when they are still alive. How about make it 90 years old or older before a person can get the benefit?
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"可是,杭特说不出退休者何时可以享受ORPP退休金。她说:“我们还在制订ORPP细则,所以人们将先向ORPP供款,这是开端。” 牛,先收钱,以后再说如何给你。360行,骗子为王。
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12 questions CPP Investment Board won’t be answering on BNN today Which brings us to the money you and I have entrusted to CPP Investment Board. $170 billion and counting. A recent CBC news article was pretty glowing about the performance of CPPIB, which prompted me to delve into the topic in our blog (see prior post “CBC falls prey to CPPIB’s spin doctors” Jan. 8-13) and on BNN last week (see prior post “Mark McQueen co-hosts BNN” Jan. 11-13). As you saw or read, things aren’t nearly as rosy as the CBC would have us believe. So BNN invited a representative of CPPIB to come on the show this afternoon and address the points and answer some basic questions; we weren’t going to ask about anything that was understandably secret, just performance-related questions regarding information that’s already being disclosed by publicly-funded pension plans in places such as California, Oregon, Texas and Washington. Or questions that arise from statements they’ve made publicly. They politely declined, citing something called their “broadcast policy”. No offer was made to answer the questions in writing; having already declined two other written requests to answer performance-related questions in 2012, it didn’t come as a surprise. Here are the 12 questions we would have asked the CPP Investment Board (with some background for you). If only they’d answer them: 1. According to CPPIB’s March 31, 2011 listing of public equity holdings, the agency owned $21 million of Sino-Forest shares. This investment exceeded the CPPIB’s investments in several other more established Canadian companies, including BCE, Bombardier, Brookfield, CIBC, Canadian Tire, Imperial Oil, National Bank, Onex, Power Corp., Shoppers Drug Mark, SNC, Telus, Thomson Reuters, TMX and TransCanada. What independent due diligence did CPPIB conduct to give it the confidence to go very over-weight into what the OSC says turned out to be a corporate fraud? 2. What are the individual IRRs of our 135 private equity fund investments? Background: According to the CPPIB 2012 “Report on Responsible Investing”, the agency says that it “adheres to the highest standards of transparency and accountability”. The state pensions of such places as California, Oregon, Texas and Washington all disclose the individual internal rates of returns on all of their private equity, debt and venture capital funds, such as Apollo, Blackstone, Carlyle, KKR, Silver Lake, etc. The “IRR” calculation is a widely-recognized metric to determine the true performance of an investment over time. CPPIB has invested in dozens of these same funds, and yet refuses to disclose the IRR calculation, preferring to report nominal performance based upon dollars in and dollars out in the home currency of the fund in questions (CAD, Euros, USD, etc.). 3. Over the past 10 years, the Canadian dollar has strengthened appreciably. The CPPIB has substantial investments in assets that are denominated in foreign currencies, and has a policy of not hedging our risk to changes in the relative valuation of these currencies against the Canadian dollar. What is the true individual performance of our 135 private equity fund investments when you take into account the huge swings in the currencies we’ve invested in? Background: At the present time, CPPIB only discloses the nominal investment performance of a USD private equity fund in its home currency, even if we ultimately lost money on the investment once the supposed “profits” are converted back to Canadian dollars at the end of the fund’s life cycle. CPPIB reports its individual fund performance data in the currency of the (usually foreign) fund manager, rather than Canadian dollars, which is the currency that we surely must use to fund the lion’s share of our commitments to these largely U.S. and Euro-denominated multi-billion dollar private equity vehicles. CalPERS, CalSTRS, Oregon, WSIB and UTIMCO all report the individual fund level return data on the basis of their own invested currency (being U.S. dollars), rather than the currency of the private equity vehicle in question (whether it be denominated in Canadian dollars, Euros or Renminbi, for example). It makes sense. Reporting a profit on a fund investment is misleading if it turns out that you actually lost money when you converted the original investment back to the currency that you use for financial statement reporting purposes. Since CPPIB has a policy of not hedging foreign currency exposure, this issue cannot be foreign to the Board of Directors. By publishing the information in the home currency of the fund, and not Canadian dollars (which is the currency of our audited financial statements, our original private equity fund investment and likely each subsequent capital call during the life of the individual fund), Canadians are unable to ascertain whether or not we made a profit or loss on each of these 135 investment vehicles – leaving aside the absence of an individual fund IRR calculation. As such, Canadians cannot asses “how investments are performing”, since we have no idea about the impact of the changes in the relative values of the Canadian and U.S. dollars (or Euros) are having on our specific investment in this fund. Worse, CPPIB’s current disclosure approach invariably misleads Canadians. Here’s an example: On June 30, 2005, to satisfy a capital call on our US$413.5 million commitment to Blackstone V, CPPIB needed to convert 1.2256 Canadian dollars to buy 1 U.S. dollar. Over the course of the next few years, we would have paid rates such as 1.115 (June 30, 2006), 1.0634 (June 29, 2007), and so forth to satisfy follow-on capital calls for this U.S. dollar investment vehicle. A year ago, for example, when distributions flowed back to CPPIB from this particular fund, CPPIB would have been converting U.S. dollars at a rate of 1.0192: about 20% below the value of the representative 2005 capital call. However, according to the CPPIB’s website, we still made a positive return 3.3% on the investment due to the CPPIB’s U.S. dollar fund performance reporting approach. Given Blackstone V’s modest nominal return of 3.3% on our capital (according to CPPIB’s website), we likely lost money on our investment when the currency impact is taken into consideration…which is what is ultimately baked into the audited financial statements of the CPPIB. Yet unavailable for specific fund level review by Canadians, unlike the people of Oregon, for example, a state of 3.8 million people. 4. CPPIB has committed over $30 billion to external private funds over the past decade. What IRR has CPPIB earned on its investment via the entire asset class of its external LBO managers, since the inception? Weighted by dollar invested / realized. 5. CPPIB has disclosed to the media that it made hundreds of millions via its co-investment in Skype when it was acquired by Microsoft in 2011. At the same time, CPPIB refuses to disclose to the media how much we’ve lost on other mega private equity LBO co-investment deals that went south, such as EMI (went bankrupt in 2011), Freescale, SunGuard, TXU…. Why does CPPIB only disclose the details of the PE wins and not the losses? CPPIB’s spokesperson claims it’s because Skype was public information, and yet Freescale is now a public company again, and the EMI bankruptcy was a very public event when Citibank took control. 6. As CPPIB’s size grows, so too does the relative cost of the overhead associated with the internal management of the fund. This is counterintuitive. CPPIB’s MER is about 25 basis points, while the MER for similarly-large Ontario Teachers Pension Plan is approximately 20 basis points. Which means CPPIB spends 25% more to manage the same dollar. Why is that? Background: In 2006, the CPPIB spent $54 million on salaries and staff pension contributions ($26M), general and administrative costs ($21M), and professional fees ($7M). With $73.6 billion of average assets under management that year, our Management Expense Ratio was 0.07%. In two year’s time, the MER doubled to 0.13%, as average assets grew to $119.3 billion and our SG&A tripled to $154 million as the not-so-new management team of CEO David Denison and then-EVP Mark Wiseman settled into their roles. For the 2012 fiscal year, our CPPIB MER was up four fold to 0.28%, with $440 million of internal overhead managing $154.9 billion of average net assets. During David Denison’s tenure as CEO, internal management costs grew 286%, and $1.347 billion in aggregate was spent between 2008-2012 on overhead — all to achieve an annualized total return of 2.2% — well below the 4% plus inflation target required to keep the plan solvent. Last time I checked, Ontario Teachers’ MER was a modest 0.20%-0.21%, and the HOOPP was getting by with 0.18%-0.22% of their gross assets under management. On a gross asset basis, CPPIB’s internal staff MER drops to about 0.25% from 0.28%, which means it still would cost the CPPIB $60-70 million more internally than the Teachers to manage the same asset pool. Moreover, with $30 billion of external private equity commitments, unlike HOOPP and OTTPP which limit the use of external PE managers as much as they can, CPPIB is paying external management fees of between 1-1.5% per annum there too. Another $300 million to $450 million in fees and expenses to manage that pile of dough (according to CPPIB’s annual report, they paid $650 million in total external management fees in 2012), pushing our comparable MER closer to 0.55%, dramatically higher than OMERS’s figure of 0.45-0.47%. 7. CPPIB owns $233 million of stock in four U.S. tobacco companies. As a founding signatory to the United Nations’ Principles for Responsible Investing, CPPIB has agreed to define responsible investing as “excluding companies from the investment universe on the basis of criteria relating to their products, activities, policies, or performance. This includes sector-based screening (where entire sectors are excluded)….” According to the CBC, CPPIB advises that “The CPPIB is mandated by law to evaluate companies only by their investment potential; morals and politics generally don’t enter the picture.” How does the CPPIB explain investing in tobacco firms, unlike CalPERS for example, while at the same time adhering to its duties to the United Nations? 8. One of CPPIB’s stated PRI tests is “anti-corruption practices”. As of its most recent financial statements, CPPIB owned $175 million of HSBC stock and $74 million of UBS shares. Together, these banks recently paid US$3.5 billion in fines after admitting they were engaged in illegal activity over an extended period of time. In HSBC’s case, the fine was for multi-billion dollar drug money laundering. These firms have broken the “anti-corruption” requirement of the CPPIB’s Policy for Responsible Investing. Has the CPPIB sold these shares now that the banks have plead guilty? If not, why not? 9. How many individual investments over the last 5 years were rejected or subsequently divested by CPPIB due to a conflict with CPPIB’s Policy on Responsible Investing? What drove those decisions? 10. According to my analysis, 59% of a broadly representative group (53 of 135) of CPPIB’s external private equity managers were producing an IRR below 6%, which is what CPPIB’s Chief Actuary says is required for the CPPIB to be solvent over the long term. Is this of concern? If not, why not? 11. In February 2010, CPPIB announced that it was making a new $400 million allocation to Canadian venture capital and private equity managers via an external manager (Northleaf). At the time, CPPIB CEO Mark Weisman told the Globe and Mail’s Boyd Erman that he was excited about the opportunity presented by the Canadian venture landscape. As of March 2012, only $39 million of the $400 million had been drawn by fund managers. Over the past three years, a raft of Canadian innovation-related funds have closed, including Vanedge, Georgian, iNovia, Lumira, Merck Lumira, Rho, Celtic, TVM and Wellington Financial. According to industry sources, none of the CPPIB’s $400 million was committed to these nine funds. Is this true? If not, how much of CPPIB’s 2010 $400 million vehicle has been committed to date to Canadian-based venture funds? 12. In October 2012, CPPIB announced that it had loaned $400 million to the company that puts on the Formula One car races. CPPIB exec Andre Bourbonnais told the Globe and Mail that the CPPIB’s analysis was simple: “For us is was really an analysis of who was the counter-party, and in F1 if your counter-party is the principality of Monaco you’re pretty sure they’re going to be good on their commitment”. Since the Formula One is owned by CVC Capital Partners, Waddell & Reed Financial and Bernie Ecclestone, what role does Monaco have in guaranteeing our $400 million 7-year loan? MRM Read more: http://www.wellingtonfund.com/blog/2013/01/17/12-questions-cpp-investment-board-wont-be-answering-on-bnn-today/#ixzz3YoPZwBCq
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可以不买吗? 多数党, 你能怎么样?
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自雇的可以不买,只拿分红就是了
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捲薩伯里補選風波 韋恩接受省警盤問 (多倫多29日加新社電)安省警方周三盤問省長韋恩(Kathleen Wynne,圖)﹐有關最近一場安省補選﹐自由黨向前候選人承諾工作或任命的說法。 省長辦公室周三發表聲明﹐確認警方與省長會面﹐但沒說明地點、時間長短﹐多少探員參與。 省長新聞秘書阿斯特拉瓦斯(Zita Astravas)的聲明說﹕「省長坦率回應﹐她的回應與此前她發出的公開聲明一致。有關薩伯里(Sudbury)補選的指控﹐省長對省議會、媒體和公眾都很坦率。」 但省長辦公室拒絕回應有關韋恩與警方會晤的問題﹐阿斯特拉瓦斯說﹕「我們仍會全面配合﹐但不會再次評論﹐因為那會干預目前的調查。」 安省保守黨和新民主黨領袖周二說﹐現任省長被警方盤問﹐「令人震驚」、「不體面」。 在薩伯里補選前﹐自由黨去年省選的薩伯里候選人奧利維爾(Andrew Olivier)說﹐韋恩副幕僚長索巴拉(Pat Sorbara)、薩伯里自由黨人兼警政委員會主席拉菲德(Gerry Lougheed)找他﹐向他提出工作或任命條件﹐要求他讓位﹐給韋恩欽點的明星候選人、前新民主黨國會議員蒂博(Glenn Thibeault)。
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抗议没有用, 全民都知道自由党敛财, 选 自由党的SB们是利益的这, 除非韦恩笑死: 我愿意捐钱买花圈
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选 自由党的绝对不是sb, 自由党从咱们身上刮的油水,他们都能分上一杯羹的
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不要在这信口瞎说好不好。cpp是完全独立于政府的退休基金。有专业公司管理,投资和收益完全透明。
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自由党已经变成敛财党,贪污党,变态党。好好的安省被他们毁了。
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自由党真可怕。
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分两方面说 1.想法是好的 2.这个基金被安省自由党管理,100块钱估计基金会自己要花掉90,等到我们退休的时候,不是负数就很好了。不如把这笔钱交给CPP统一管理。
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对头,想法不坏,执行起来,肯定钱被挪用。想想电厂。。。。。。
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呵呵,想法好吗?要真是想帮助老百姓退休,可以强制公司为职工买RPP嘛(在Manulife, Sunlife, West-Life...都可以买),为什么要把钱收到政府手中?自由党省政府挥霍的老百姓血汗还少吗?
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回复 西风纵:你懂个屁啊? 公司能这样做吗?CPP能让公司去运作吗? 这里面有雇主必须贡献的一半, 不是政府是无法做的!
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CPP和这ORPP巨大基金肯定缺乏监管和透明度。就拿强制的CPP而言,现在这些巨大的资金都由谁负责并投资在哪些股票/债券? CPP延迟到67岁才能拿到,为什么?投资受损?或有人贪污投资所得?老唐私人投资落败就坐牢,那CPP投资管理人哪?查过吗? 省府将卖电力公司股票,明年OPG的工会员工将会得到免费的电力公司股票以换取稍微降低他们的豪华的PENSION。 这个社会的最大不公平就是:许多贵族工会的工人退休可拿100%工资(纳税人付款)而且如果很早就工作,基本上50多岁就100%退休金了。而许多其他工人得干一辈子到67岁才能拿那一点可怜的CPP。
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你好像知道很多内幕似的, 可又在挑拨是非, 政府机构员工最好的PENSION 就是干一年有2%, 要拿到100%就要干50年, 50 多岁拿到100%, 就要10岁之前开始为人民服务了, 开什么玩笑!
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回复 刚好路过:一般70%封顶,按照退休前3年平均工资算。10万不多吧?退休金7万,普通人CPP只有1万多把?差6,7倍你都觉得很合理吗?
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应该同时立法规定政府不能以任何借口挪用ORPP中的资金。安省自由党这头贪婪的狼早就盘算好怎么挪用这些钱去弥补他们制造的庞大赤字了。
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