Her Key Testimonies:
Sept. 6, 2018: Ben Chin, chief of staff to Finance Minister Bill Morneau, to Jessica Prince, Wilson-Raybould’s chief of staff
He wanted to talk about SNC and what we could do, if anything, to address this. He said to her that if they don’t get a DPA, they will leave Montreal, and it’s the Quebec election right now, so we can’t have that happen. He said that they have a big meeting coming up on Tuesday and that this bad news may go public.
Sept. 16: Mathieu Bouchard and Elder Marques, senior advisors to the Prime Minister, to Jessica Prince
They said that they think we should be able to find a more reasonable resolution here. They told her that SNC’s next board meeting is on Thursday (Sept 20). They also mention the Quebec election context.
Sept. 17: Prime Minister Justin Trudeau and Clerk of the Privy Council Michael Wernick, to Wilson-Raybould
The PM again cited potential loss of jobs and SNC moving. Then to my surprise—the Clerk started to make the case for the need to have a DPA—he said ‘there is a board meeting on Thursday (Sept 20) with stock holders’ … ‘they will likely be moving to London if this happens’… ‘and there is an election in Quebec soon’…At that point the PM jumped in stressing that there is an election in Quebec and that ‘and I am an MP in Quebec—the member for Papineau.’
I was quite taken aback. My response—and I remember this vividly—was to ask the PM a direct question while looking him in the eye—I asked: ‘Are you politically interfering with my role / my decision as the AG? I would strongly advise against it.’ The Prime Minister said, ‘No, no, no—we just need to find a solution.’
Oct. 26: Mathieu Bouchard to Jessica Prince
My COS (chief of staff) said that this would obviously be perceived as interference and her boss questioning the DPP’s decision. Mathieu said that if—six months from the election—SNC announces they are moving their headquarters out of Canada, that is bad. He said “we can have the best policy in the world, but we need to be re-elected.
回复
星洲炒米
2019-02-27 19:27
举报
8
The only parts of this note that I will disclose are as follows: “the DPP is of the view that an invitation to negotiate will not be made in this case and that no announcement will be made by the PPSC.” As with all section 13 notices – the Director provides the information so that the Attorney General may take such course of action as they deem appropriate.
In other words, the Director had made her decision to not negotiate a remediation agreement with SNC Lavalin.
I subsequently spoke to my Minister’s office staff about this decision and I did the standard practice of undertaking further internal work and due diligence in relation to this note – a practice that I had for many of the section 13 notices that I received as the Attorney General. In other words, I immediately put in motion, within my Department and Minister’s office, a careful consideration and study of the matter.
Two days later, on September 6, one of the first communications about a DPA was received from outside our department. Ben Chin, Minister Morneau’s Chief of Staff, emailed my Chief of Staff and they arranged to talk. He wanted to talk about SNC and what we could do, if anything, to address this. He said to her that if they don't get a DPA, they will leave Montreal, and it's the Quebec election right now, so we can't have that happen. He said that they have a big meeting coming up on Tuesday and that this bad news may go public.
This same day my Chief of Staff exchanged some emails with my MO Staff about this, who advised her that the Deputy Attorney General – Nathalie Drouin – was working on something (they had spoken to her about the issue), and that my staff were drafting a memo as well on the role of the AG vis à vis the PPSC.
It was on or about this day that I requested a one-on-one meeting with the Prime Minister on another matter of urgency – and as soon as possible after I got back into the Country. This request would ultimately become the meeting on September 17 between myself and the Prime Minister that has been widely reported in the media.
On September 7, my Chief of Staff spoke by phone with my then Deputy Minister about the call she had received from Ben Chin and the Deputy stated that the Department was working on this. The Deputy gave my Chief a quick rundown of what she thought some options might be (e.g., informally call Kathleen Roussel, set up an external review of their decision, etc.). On the same day I received a note from my staff – on the role of the AG – a note that was also shared with Elder Marques and Amy Archer at the PMO.
Same day, Francois G. and Emma met with my Deputy Minister. Some excerpts of the s. 13 note were read to the DM, but the DM did not want to be provided with a copy of the s. 13 note.
回复
星洲炒米
2019-02-27 19:25
举报
8
Speaking Notes
The Honourable Jody Wilson-Raybould
The Standing Committee on Justice and Human Rights
February 27, 2019
Gilakas’la. Thank you Mr. Chair and members of the Justice committee for providing me the opportunity to give extended testimony to you today. I would like to acknowledge that we are on the ancestral lands of the Algonquin people.
For a period of approximately four months between September and December 2018, I experienced a consistent and sustained effort by many people within the government to seek to politically interfere in the exercise of prosecutorial discretion in my role as the Attorney General of Canada in an inappropriate effort to secure a Deferred Prosecution Agreement with SNC-Lavalin. These events involved 11 people (excluding myself and my political staff) – from the Prime Minister’s Office, the Privy Council Office, and the Office of the Minister of Finance. This included in-person conversations, telephone calls, emails, and text messages. There were approximately 10 phone calls and 10 meetings specifically about SNC-Lavalin that I and/or my staff was a part of.
Within these conversations, there were express statements regarding the necessity for interference in the SNC-Lavalin matter, the potential for consequences, and veiled threats if a DPA was not made available to SNC. These conversations culminated on December 19, 2018, with a phone conversation I had
with the Clerk of the Privy Council – a conversation for which I will provide some significant detail.
A few weeks later, on January 7, 2019, I was informed by the Prime Minister that I was being shuffled out of the role of Minister of Justice and the Attorney General of Canada.
For most of these conversations, I made contemporaneous and detailed notes – notes, in addition to my clear memory, which I am relying on today among other documentation.
My goal in my testimony is to outline the details of these communications for the Committee, and indeed for all Canadians. However, before doing that, let me make a couple comments.
First, I want to thank Canadians for their patience since this February 7th story broke in the Globe and Mail… Thank you as well specifically to those who reached out to me from across the country. I appreciate the messages – I have read them all.
Secondly, on the role of the Attorney General – the AG exercises prosecutorial discretion as provided for under the Director of Public Prosecutions Act. Generally, this authority is exercised by the DPP, but the AG has the authority to issue directives to the DPP on specific prosecutions or to take over prosecutions.
It is well-established that when the AG exercises prosecutorial discretion, she or he does so individually and independently. These are not cabinet decisions.
I will say that it is appropriate for Cabinet colleagues to draw to the AG’s attention what they see as important public policy considerations that are relevant to decisions about how a prosecution will proceed. What is not appropriate is pressing on the AG matters that she or he cannot take into account, such as partisan political considerations; continuing to urge the AG to change her or his mind for months after the decision has been made; or suggesting that a collision with the Prime Minister on these matters should be avoided.
With that said, the remainder of my testimony will be a detailed and factual delineation of the approximately 10 phone calls, 10 in-person meetings, and emails and text messages that were part of an effort to politically interfere regarding the SNC matter for the purposes of securing a deferred prosecution.
The story begins on September 4, 2018. My COS and I were overseas when I was sent a ‘Memorandum for the Attorney General (pursuant to section 13 of the Director of Public Prosecutions Act) which was entitled ‘Whether to issue an invitation to negotiate a remediation agreement to SNC Lavalin’ which was prepared by the Director of Public Prosecutions, Kathleen Rous
前司法部长出席作证 确认总理干预司法